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Brian Leftow’s God and Necessity is interesting, full of details, bold and 
ambitious. Roughly, the main question at hand is: assuming there is 
a God that is the source of all secular truths, i.e. all truths not involving 
God, as per some forms of theism, how should we understand secular 
modal truths of the form possibly p, impossibly p, and necessarily p? In 
particular, if p is metaphysically necessary, p just could not have been 
false, so how could God be the ultimate source of it? If p just could not 
have been false, it seems God had no choice but to comply with it, and as 
such he cannot really be its ultimate source.
Roughly, Leftow’s solution goes as follows,1 where the modality in 3-5, 
but not in 2, is the traditional metaphysical modality of secular truths:
(1) A perfect, personal God, having a limited deity, exists.2
(2) It’s in God to F if, and only if, God allows himself to F.3
(3) Possibly F if, and only if, God allows himself to think F.4
(4) Impossibly F if, and only if, God disallows himself to think F (or 
simply, on the basis of 3: not possibly F).
(5) Necessarily F if, and only if, God disallows himself to think not F 
(or simply, on the basis of 3: not possibly not F).
1 This is of course not the whole story! Due to space, I must here leave out too many 
details. But I hope to have captured what’s needed for the more critical points to come.
2 Limited in the sense of not determining all God does.
3 Leftow’s (2012: 252) official definition is this: God has it in him to do A =df God is 
intrinsically such that (if God wills to have the power to do A, then God has the power to 
do A). I have simplified this definition, but nothing here hinges on it.
4 Perhaps more accurately: if, and only if, God allows himself and uses the power to 
think F; and correspondingly with impossibility and necessity in claims 4 and 5 below.
18 EINAR DUENGER BOHN
Leftow (2012: 494) accepts three and only three brute necessities: (i) that 
a perfect, personal God exists; (ii) that God has a limited deity;5 and (iii) 
that God allows himself to think the thoughts he does and not some 
others. Leftow calls the latter the Biggest Bang, or simply the Bang.
I have argued against the perfect being theology behind (i) elsewhere 
(Bohn 2012); and I have nothing intelligent to say about (ii), but I will 
here, for the most part, simply assume (i)-(ii), and hence 1, and focus 
on (iii), and what it and issues surrounding it says about the success of 
Leftow’s solution to the initial problem.
I.
First, note, as reflected in 2-5 and (i)-(iii), that Leftow’s account is not 
an explanation of all metaphysical modality in terms of non-modality, 
but only a reduction of the metaphysical modality of secular truths to 
whatever kind of modality is involved in what it is in God to do and 
not to do; Leftow (2012: 352-353, 476) calls it causal modality. But it’s 
not clear that’s a good term for it, since it is not just our more or less 
ordinary notion of causal modality (cf. Leftow 2012: 352-353), but 
a  causal modality in the sense of what it’s in a  perfect, personal God 
(with a limited deity) to do and not to do. At least it is not obvious to 
me, as it seems to be for Leftow (2012: e.g. 476), that our best analysis 
of more or less ordinary causation carries over to what it’s in a perfect 
God to do and not to do. So, to keep that in mind, I’ll henceforth call it 
divine modality. Leftow thus explains secular metaphysical modality in 
terms of divine modality:6 what it’s in God to do and not to do; and, in 
particular, what God allows/disallows himself to think. Divine modality, 
in turn, is brute.
Second, note that logical and mathematical truths are traditionally 
taken to be metaphysically necessary truths, but, according to Leftow 
(2012: 251), they are not secular truths, so they fall outside the domain 
of the present account, which is only concerned with secular truths.7 
5 (i) and (ii) thus jointly entail that claim 1 holds of brute necessity.
6 By ’secular metaphysical modality’ and ’secular metaphysical modal space’ 
I  henceforth simply mean the metaphysical modality of secular truths and the 
metaphysical modal space of secular truths, respectively.
7 Leftow (2012:251) claims they are not secular truths because they involve 
unrestricted quantification, which brings God into their domain. I’m not sure I follow the 
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(Leftow (2012: 366-367) suggests locating the metaphysical necessity of 
logic and mathematics in the nature of God, but he leaves its defence for 
another time.)
Third, note that whatever God in fact allowed/disallowed himself 
to think, determines secular metaphysical modal space as per 3-5 
above, but, for all that has been said, and in fact according to Leftow 
(2012: e.g. 252, 291, 368-373), it’s nonetheless in God to have thought 
differently, and hence it’s in God to have determined a different secular 
metaphysical modal space. In other words, God divinely could have 
thought up something that is in fact metaphysically impossible; but he 
just didn’t, and therefore it is in fact metaphysically impossible. For 
example, Leftow (2012: 367) claims that Socrates not being a number is 
such a case. Leftow also seems to think it is in God to have made possible 
that something is red all over and blue all over at the same time. For he 
(2012: 253) claims: [it is in God to make it the case that p & it’s in God 
to make it the case that q] iff [it’s in God to make it the case that p & 
q]. Clearly, being perfectly powerful, it’s in God to make it the case that 
a given billiard ball is red all over at time t and it’s in God to make it the 
case that it is blue all over at t, so it immediately follows by Leftow’s claim 
that it’s in God to make it the case that the billiard ball is red all over and 
blue all over at t.
II.
I believe many questions arise at this point. For example, as said above, 
(i)-(iii) are brute necessities, but what kind of brute necessity is it? 
thoughts here because that seems to make any claim that implicitly or explicitly involve 
unrestricted quantification into a non-secular truth. So, for example, consider the claim: 
‘I have no favourite object.’ This is implicitly committed to unrestricted quantification: 
it is committed to nothing being my favourite object, which means for anything, it is not 
my favourite object. But is that really a non-secular truth involving God? It seems to 
have nothing to do with God. The problem seems to generalize, even into essentialist 
claims, which is in the domain of Leftow’s account. Consider the claim below: nothing 
can be red all over and blue all over at the same time. This too is implicitly committed 
to unrestricted quantification, and is therefore non-secular according to Leftow. Leftow 
might blame this on them being negative existentials without ontologies, but there is still 
a problem as to how to identify negative existentials, given the interdefinability of the 
quantifiers, as well as that all impossibilities are then ruled out of his account, given the 
interdefinability of the modal operators. Unfortunately, I cannot go further into this here.
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According to Leftow’s account, (i)-(iii) is true in all possible worlds,8 
and hence they are metaphysically necessary, but it’s nonetheless in God 
to have determined a  different secular modal space by simply having 
thought differently, so, in some sense or other, at least (iii) could be false: 
it’s in him to have had other thoughts.9 In other words, at least (iii) is 
metaphysically necessary, but divinely contingent; but then in what sense 
is it a brute necessity? To the extent it is a necessity, it is not brute (it’s 
explained in terms of what God actually did), and to the extent it is brute, 
it is not a necessity (it’s just what God actually did, but it’s nonetheless in 
God to have done differently).10
However, the more interesting question at this point is this: is Leftow 
on the tracks towards solving the initial puzzle? That is, does Leftow 
give the beginnings of an explanation of secular modal truths, and in 
particular secular metaphysical necessities, in terms of God?
I think not. Traditionally understood, metaphysical modality is the 
widest modality there is. That is, metaphysical modal space includes all 
possibilities; none are left out. So, something is metaphysically necessary 
iff it just couldn’t have failed to be the case; and it is metaphysically 
impossible iff it just couldn’t have been the case; no matter what. 
Metaphysical modal space is thus absolute; and its absoluteness is why it 
is hard to explain its source. It’s also why there is a puzzle to begin with for 
any theist who claims that God is the source of all truths. Metaphysical 
necessity and impossibility, even secular such truths, just couldn’t have 
been different, so it seems God had no choice but to comply with it, and 
as such cannot be its source.
As we’ve seen, Leftow’s attempt to solve the puzzle consists in 
explaining secular metaphysical modality in terms of divine modality, or 
what it’s in God to do and not to do, as per 2-5 above; and he in turn takes 
such divine modality as primitive. But, as pointed out above, according 
to Leftow’s account, it’s divinely possible that secular metaphysical 
modal space could have been different, and in particular that secular 
metaphysical necessities could have been different, so, in what sense has 
8 Though be aware: Leftow (2012: e.g. 444) has a fictionalist attitude towards possible 
world-talk.
9 Presumably, there is no sense in which God could have made (i) or (ii) false, but 
I think we should still ask: what kind of brute necessity is it? For example, why is it not 
in God to annihilate himself?
10 Leftow might object that this worry equivocates on ‘could’; an objection we’ll get 
back to later.
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Leftow explained the source of such truths, rather than simply denied 
their modal status of necessity in favour of brute divine contingency?
What we traditionally take to be secular metaphysical necessity is, as 
far as I can tell, for Leftow simply a brute divine contingency: it’s in God 
to have thought differently, and hence, as per 2-5 above, it’s in God to have 
determined a different secular metaphysical modal space. So, traditional 
secular metaphysical necessity is for Leftow explained in terms of brute 
divine contingency (whatever God happened to allow/disallow himself, 
though he could have allowed/disallowed himself differently); but that is 
not so much an explanation of traditional secular metaphysical necessity 
as it is a denial of its necessity. A traditionalist will simply see this as no 
secular metaphysical necessity at all, only brute divine contingency.
The argument is simple: a secular metaphysical necessity p just could 
not have been false; but, on Leftow’s account, it’s in God to have thought 
differently, and hence made p false; so God could, in some sense or other, 
have made p false; so, on Leftow’s account, p is not a secular metaphysical 
necessity after all.
Leftow could deny premise 1, namely that a  secular metaphysical 
necessity p just could not have been false, but then he is, as far as I can 
tell, again simply denying that it really is a metaphysical necessity after all.
Leftow might also object that ‘metaphysical necessity’ just means 
something like truth in all possible worlds;11 and all possible worlds are 
determined by what God happened to allow/disallow himself to think; so, 
in that sense, what it’s in God to do does in fact determine metaphysical 
necessity. This allows him (2012: 373) to coherently say: ‘It is in God 
to have had other Bangs, but none are in fact possible.’ Possibility is 
understood in terms of possible worlds, which are determined by the 
Bang; but what it’s in God to do and not to do is not thus determined. This 
amounts to denying the last step of my argument, perhaps by accusing it 
of equivocation on ‘could’.
But this amounts to denying our traditional way of cashing out 
secular metaphysical necessity in terms of possible worlds. Traditionally 
understood, that p is true in all possible worlds is just a way of saying 
that p just cannot be false, no matter what; there just are no possible 
ways for the world to be such that p is false. But on Leftow’s account, 
there is a  way for the world to be such that secular p is false, namely 
11 I say ’something like’ because Leftow adopts a fictionalist attitude towards possible 
worlds-talk.
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the way it would have been if God had just thought differently. So, it 
seems Leftow’s secular metaphysical necessity is no real necessity, but 
rather a contingency under a different name. On Leftow’s account, all 
possible worlds fail to capture all possibilities; but on a traditional way 
of cashing out metaphysical necessity that is exactly what all possible 
worlds are intended to capture.12 So, on a traditional understanding of 
secular metaphysical necessity in terms of truth in all possible worlds, 
the last step of my argument is valid, not equivocating on ‘could’.
Leftow might also object that God could not have made any secular 
metaphysical necessity p false, only some of them. For example, 
according to Leftow (2012: 334), it’s not in God to have made it the case 
that a  ≠  a, for some particular possible secular a.13 But then, if some 
secular metaphysical necessities are brute, not due to God, Leftow’s 
account is very ad hoc, not much of a principled explanation. At best, we 
only have an explanation of some, but only some of secular metaphysical 
modality in terms of divine modality, while some (other parts) of secular 
metaphysical modality is left brute (along with all other non-secular 
metaphysical necessities?). That is ad hoc, not much of a  principled 
explanation; one is left wondering: why not just think all of it is brute 
then? Especially given what’s argued above, namely that even the secular 
metaphysical necessities that are explained in terms of what God allowed/
disallowed himself to think are really brute divine contingencies.
Leftow could complain, or rather insist, that I wrongly treat divine 
modality as a  form of metaphysical modality. For example, he (2012: 
253) says: ‘One might wonder whether “it is in God to bring it about 
that” is a new sort of modal operator. If so, it is not a very exciting one.’ 
Letting ‘I’ symbolize it, Leftow (2012: 253) goes on to say that ‘If there are 
worlds, there are no I-worlds as a layer beyond possible worlds ... At no 
time in any possible world has anything only status I.’
This again assumes metaphysical necessity is equivalent with truth 
in all possible worlds, but restricts the set of all possible worlds to the 
Bang – a Bang it is in God to have done differently – and thus in turn 
restricts our notion of metaphysical necessity to a set of truths that it is in 
God to have made differently. But a traditionalist will, and should, simply 
12 After all, if all possible worlds don’t capture all possibilities, they are inadequate for 
understanding metaphysical modality!
13 Note that ‘a  =  a’ does not obviously involve unrestricted quantification (‘a’ is 
a constant), nor is it obviously a logical truth (it does not have the form of a tautology); 
so it’s not obvious that it is a non-secular truth, according to Leftow’s account.
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deny this restriction of our notion of possible worlds, and thus in turn 
the restriction on our notion of metaphysical necessity. A possible world 
is just a way total reality could have been; if it is in God to have changed 
the truth-value of a secular proposition p, then p is not true in all the 
ways total reality could have been, which means p is not a metaphysical 
necessity. Calling a contingency a necessity doesn’t make it so.
III.
I conclude that, though interesting and rewarding to study, as far as I can 
see, Leftow’s account ultimately fails to explain secular metaphysical 
necessity in terms of what it is in God to do and not to do. Whether we 
use the phrase ‘it is in God to have thought differently’ or ‘God could have 
thought differently’ is of no matter: what he actually thought remains 
contingent, and so does whatever depends on what he actually thought. 
Calling a contingency a necessity doesn’t make it so.14
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